Mechanism design deals with distributed algorithms that are executed with self-interested agents. The designer, whose objective is to optimize some function of the agents private types, needs to construct a computation that takes into account agent incentives which are not necessarily in alignment with the objective of the mechanism. Traditionally, mechanisms are designed for agents who only care about the utility they derive from the mechanism outcome, which often fully or partially discloses their (declared) types. Such mechanisms may become inadequate when agents are privacy-aware, i.e., when their loss of privacy adversely affects their utility. In such cases ignoring privacy-awareness in the design of a mechanism may render it not incentive compatible, and hence inefficient. Interestingly, and somewhat counter-intuitively, Xiao [eprint 2011] has recently showed that this can happen even when the mechanism preserves a strong notion of privacy.
INTRODUCTION
Mechanism design deals with distributed algorithms that are executed with selfmotivated agents who optimize their own objective functions. The mechanism designer, interested in computing some function of the agents' private inputs (henceforth types), needs to construct a computation that takes into account the agents' incentives, which are not necessarily in alignment with the goals of the designer. Settings where mechanism design is instrumental include centralized allocation of resources, pricing, the level of provision of a public good, etc. Traditionally, agents are modeled to care about the utility they derive from the outcome of the mechanism, but not about their privacy. Consequently, in many cases the outcome of the mechanism fully discloses the types declared by (some or all) agents.
We look at a model where agents also assign non-positive utility to the leakage of information about their private types through the public outcome of the mechanism. This modeling is relevant, e.g., when private information is aggregated via markets which provide superior prediction power (e.g., [Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004] ), kidney exchange markets where information aggregation and sharing lead to huge healthcare benefits (e.g., [Ashlagi and Roth 2011] ), or recommendation engines which assist individuals in locating optimal products. Such markets may not be incentive compatible and consequently can fail if agents' privacy is not accounted for.
Our work is on the interface of the research in Algorithmic Game Theory and the recent theoretical research of privacy. Earlier scholarly work by McSherry and Talwar [2007] has forged a link between the notion of differential privacy [Dwork et al. 2006 ] and mechanism design. They observed that differential privacy can serve as a tool for constructing mechanisms where truthfulness is ε-dominant. A recent work [Nissim et al. 2012] has observed a few weaknesses in constructions resulting from [McSherry and Talwar 2007] and resolved them by putting forward a general framework for constructing approximately-optimal mechanisms where truthfulness is a dominant strategy or an ex-post Nash equilibrium. This line of work demonstrates that differential privacy can serve as a powerful tool for the construction of efficient mechanisms.
The mechanisms presented in [McSherry and Talwar 2007; Nissim et al. 2012] were not analyzed with respect to agents who take into account their dis-utility due to the information leaked about their types. We call this dis-utility information utility and we call those agents that take the information utility into account privacy-aware. It might be tempting to think that the combination of truthfulness and differential privacy is always sufficient for making privacy-aware agents truthful -mechanisms that are truthful and preserve differential privacy should remain truthful also with respect to agents that take information utility into account. A work of Xiao [2011] dispels this intuition by showing a mechanism that preserves differential privacy and is truthful with respect to agents that are not privacy aware, yet, under a particular definition of information utility, truthfulness is not dominant with respect to privacy-aware agents.
A recent work of Ghosh and Roth [2011] constructs mechanisms that compensate agents for their loss in privacy. Ghosh and Roth consider a setting where a data analyst wishing to perform an ε-differentially private computation of a statistic pays the participating agents for using their data. They construct mechanisms where agents declare how their information utility depends on the privacy parameter ε, and the mechanism chooses ε, decides which agents' information will be used in the computation, and how much those agents will be paid. The mechanisms presented in [Ghosh and Roth 2011] do not preserve the privacy of how each of the agents values her privacy. However, an agent's value for privacy can reveal information about the agents' private data: it is not unreasonable to assume that there is some correlation between the price an agents sets on her privacy and the unlikelihood of her private data or, in other words, to assume that people value their privacy more if they have something to hide.
In light of these issues, our goal is to construct mechanisms for privacy-aware agents, where privacy is accounted for the 'traditional' inputs to the mechanism (such as valuations, locations, etc.) but also, and for the first time to the best of our knowledge, with respect to the privacy valuation itself.
The results of [Ghosh and Roth 2011] show, however, that this goal is too ambitious -no individually rational mechanism can compensate individuals for the information (dis)utility incurred due to information leaked about the privacy valuation from the public output unless the privacy valuations are bounded. To overcome this obstacle we focus on mechanisms for large populations of agents: We propose a relaxation where loss in privacy is accounted for all agents whose valuations are bounded, where the bound increases as the agent population grows. Hence, in large enough populations truthfulness is provided for all (or most of) the agents. For the small fraction of agents who value their privacy too much for the mechanism to compensate, we provide εdifferential privacy with respect to whether their privacy valuations exceed the bound. The value of ε improves (i.e., reduces) with the population size.
Our Contributions
Modeling. A major contribution of this work is a new notion of privacy-aware mechanism design which we motivate in light of weaknesses found in prior modelings. In our model, privacy-aware agents hold a combined type consisting of their 'traditional' game type and their privacy type, where for the latter agents need only have a conservative upper bound on how loss of privacy adversely affects their utility. Agents care about leakage of information on both their game and privacy types. These features are an important difference with respect to previous work (e.g., [Ghosh and Roth 2011]) where a full characterization of the information utility was required to achieve truthfulness, and furthermore, mechanisms did not take into account the information cost of the privacy type.
Note that if agents can have arbitrarily high privacy valuations, then it is impossible to a priori bound the information utility of a computation whose outcome depends on agents' private inputs, or, alternatively, on their choice whether to participate or not (see also a more elaborate argument in [Ghosh and Roth 2011] in the specific context of truthful mechanisms for selling private information for statistical computations). To sidestep this inherent difficulty, we opt for a lesser requirement from a privacy-aware mechanism: the mechanism should set a threshold on the privacy valuation v max and a privacy parameter ε such that the mechanism is incentive compatible w.r.t. agents whose privacy valuations are below v max and ε-differential privacy is guaranteed for all agents.
Construction of Privacy-Aware Mechanisms. We next demonstrate that privacyaware mechanisms are feasible. Our first result illustrates some of our techniques: in Section 4.1, we provide a simple privacy-aware poll between two or more alternatives. The main idea is to make (traditional) dis-utility due to mis-reporting dominate the information utility, and hence preserve truthfulness. We set a bound v max on the privacy valuations, and treat agents differently according to whether their valuations are above v max or not: for agents whose privacy valuations are below the bound, the mechanism ensures that the agents are provided with a fair compensation for their privacy loss. For agents whose privacy valuations are too high for the mechanism to compensate, we provide that their privacy valuations are protected in a ε-differentially private way. As discussed above, this is in a sense the best we can hope to achieve. We then move our attention to large populations and we introduce the notion of admis-sible populations by making a somewhat mild assumption on the distribution of the valuations (i.e., finiteness of its moments).
In Section 5 we present a generic construction of privacy-aware mechanisms. Our construction is based on the recent construction of [Nissim et al. 2012] , where we modify the mechanism and its analysis to accommodate privacy-agents sampled from an admissible population. We show that the mechanism achieves truthfulness for most agents and non-trivial accuracy. Finally in Section 5.2 we present a natural example of a privacy-aware mechanism that falls in our framework i.e., privacy-aware selling of digital goods.
In a sense, our results show that when the outcome of a truthful (not necessarily privacy-aware) mechanism is insensitive to each of its individual inputs (as is often the case when the underlying population is large), it is rational for most privacy-aware agents to report truthfully. This is because the information leaked about their private types is small, and hence bounded away from the decrease in utility that can be caused by misreporting their type.
Other Related Work
The cryptographic literature also includes references to "privacy-preserving mechanism design" (an example is Naor et al. [1999] ). We stress that our goals are different from these cryptographic realizations of mechanisms as in our setting the agents are worried about what the public outcome of a mechanism may leak about their types and privacy valuations, whereas the goal of cryptographic realizations of mechanisms is to hide all information except for the outcome of the mechanism. As showed in [Miltersen et al. 2009 ], using cryptography to implement mechanism designs over an internet-like network is a non-trivial task, and one needs to make sure that the properties of the mechanism (e.g., truthfulness) are preserved also by the cryptographic implementation of the mechanism.
Independently from our work, Chen et al. [2011] also studied the problem of truthful mechanisms in the presence of agents that value privacy. The motivation for both their work and ours is similar, and in both the quantification of privacy loss corresponds to the effect an agent's input has on the outcome of a mechanism. The model that [Chen et al. 2011 ] presents for privacy-aware agents (and hence privacy-aware mechanisms) is different from ours in that in [Chen et al. 2011] agents are assumed to value privacy on a per-outcome basis, whereas our modeling utilizes a weaker assumption about the agents, i.e., that their privacy valuations depend on the overall (i.e., worst) outcome of the mechanism. Both modelings are well motivated, our reliance on a weaker assumption may lead to more robust mechanisms, where the per-outcome approach may lead to a richer set of privacy-aware mechanisms.
PRELIMINARIES
We refer to discrete sets T and S as the type set, and the set of social alternatives respectively. For two vectors t, t ∈ T n we define the Hamming distance between t and t to be the number of entries on which t, t differ, i.e., |{i : t i = t i }|. Vectors that are within Hamming distance one are called neighboring. A mechanism M : T n → ∆(S) is a function that assigns for any vector of inputs t ∈ T n a distribution over S (the notation ∆(S) denotes the set of probability distributions over the set S). The outcome of an execution of M on input t ∈ T n is an element s ∈ S chosen according to the distribution M (t), and the notation M (t)(S) is used for the probability measure of S w.r.t. probability distribution M (t).
Differential privacy is a very conservative way of measuring how much information a mechanism leaks about the type of any given agent -even given complete knowledge of all other agent types. Formally:
Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy [Dwork et al. 2006] ). A mechanism M : T n → ∆(S) preserves ε-differential privacy if for all neighboring t, t ∈ T n and for all (measurable) subsets S of S it holds that
The following simple lemma follows directly from the above definition (the proofs for Lemma 2.2 and Theorem 2.4 below are not new and are included for completeness in Appendix A):
LEMMA 2.2. Let M : T n → ∆(S) be a mechanism that preserves ε-differential privacy and let g :
In particular, if ε ≤ 1 and g : S → [0, 1],
Definition 2.3 ([McSherry and Talwar 2007]
). Let f : S × T n → R ≥0 and let ε > 0.
The exponential mechanism for f with parameter ε is
for all s ∈ S.
Definition 2.5 (Mutual Information). Let X, Y be two random variables. The mutual information between X and Y is defined as
It is well known that I(X; Y ) = H(X) − H(X|Y ), i.e. I(X; Y ) measures the reduction in entropy in X caused by conditioning on Y (and symmetrically, I(X; Y ) = I(Y ; X) = H(Y ) − H(Y |X)). The following simple observation follows from the data processing inequality (see, e.g., [Cover and Thomas 1991, pp. 32] ):
QUANTIFYING INFORMATION UTILITY
Our model is similar to the standard model of mechanism design, with the difference that agents participating in the execution of a mechanism care about their privacy. In the standard model, an agent's type t i expresses quantities such as a valuation of a good for sale, location, etc., the mechanism chooses an alternative s, and the agent's utility is a function of t i and s (and sometimes, monetary transfers).
When considering privacy-aware agents, we need to introduce the information utility into their utility functions. A first issue that emerges is how should this dis-utility be quantified? Note that as different agents may value privacy differently, the quantification should be parametrized by agents' privacy preferences. We denote by v i the privacy preference of agent i. That is, an agent type is now composed of the 'traditional' type t i , and a privacy preference v i . A second issue that now emerges is that the alternative chosen by the mechanism can leak information about both t i and v i , and hence leakage about v i needs also be taken into account.
How is information utility quantified in prior work. In an early work, McGrew et al. [2003] introduced privacy into agents' utility in the context of non-cooperative computing (NCC) [Shoham and Tennenholtz 2005] . In their model, agents only care about the case where other agents learn their private types with certainty. This means that privacy is either completely preserved or completely breached, and hence information utility is quantified to be either zero (no breach) or an agent dependent value v i > 0.
As it is often the case that leaked information is partial or uncertain, we are interested in more refined measures that take partial exposure into account.
A recent work by Ghosh and Roth [2011] considers a setting where a data analyst wishes to perform a computation that preserves ε-differential privacy and compensates participating agents for their privacy loss. They assume a model where each agent's dis-utility is proportional to the privacy parameter ε. I.e., the ith agent's dis-utility is
where v i ≥ 0 is part of the agent's private type. A problem with this quantification is that while ε measures the worst effect the ε-differentially private computation can have on privacy, the typical effect on agent i can be significantly lower (see [Dwork et al. 2010] ). In other words, while a differentially private mechanism guarantees that even in the worst-case one's privacy is not affected more than ε, a much better privacy may be provided on average. Furthermore, the actual information loss can depend on the other agents' inputs to the computation. Another problem, that will be further discussed later, is that this quantification does not consider the information utility due to leakage of information about v i itself.
The third example we are aware of is from another recent work, by Xiao [2011] . Similarly to the present work, Xiao considers the setting of mechanism design with privacy-aware agents. The information utility is modeled to be
where v i ≥ 0 is the agent privacy valuation. Note that with this measure, the disutility of agent i depends on the distribution of her and the other agents' types, and on her own strategy σ. The following example demonstrates that this dependency on σ is problematic.
Consider the single-agent mechanism below, where the agent's private type consists of a single bit:
Example 3.1 (The "Rye or Wholewheat" game). Alice is preparing a sandwich for Bob and inquires whether he prefers Rye (R) or Wholewheat (W). Bob wants to enjoy his favorite sandwich, but does not want Alice to learn his preference. Assume that Bob's type is uniformly chosen in {R, W} and consider these two possibilities for Bob's strategy:
(1) If Bob provides his true preference he will enjoy the sandwich. However, his information (dis)utility would be maximized as I(t Bob ; M (σ truthf ul (t Bob ))) = 1.
(2) If Bob answers at random he will enjoy the sandwich with probability one-half. 1 However, as his response does not depend on his preference no loss in privacy would be incurred, hence we get
Note that since Bob's type is R or W with equal probability Alice's views of Bob's actions (and hence also the outcome of the mechanism) are distributed identically whether he uses σ truthf ul or σ random . Hence, while mutual information differs dramatically between the two strategies -suggesting that Bob is suffering a privacy loss due to Alice learning his type in one but not in the other -it is impossible for Alice to distinguish between the two cases! A few more words are in place regarding the source of this problem. First note that while the example demonstrates that I(t Bob ; M (σ(t Bob ))) is problematic as a measure of privacy it does not imply that σ random (nor the one time pad) is at fault (in fact, σ random provides Bob with perfect privacy even in a setting where Alice gets to know which strategy Bob uses, a guarantee σ truthf ul definitely does not provide). What the example capitalizes on is the fact that under the standard game-theoretic modeling it is possible that Alice does not get to see what Bob's strategy is. In such situations, it can happen that the more robust σ random is an overkill, as it provides Bob with less utility. We hence argue that the notion of information cost should be free of making assumptions on Alice's knowledge of σ.
Our Approach
We deviate from the works cited above as we do not present a new measure for information utility. We use a significantly weaker notion instead. To motivate our approach, re-consider the measures discussed above.
Looking first at the measure in [Ghosh and Roth 2011] , i.e., v i · ε, we note that while in ε-differential mechanisms the ratio Pr[M (t) = s]/ Pr[M (t ) = s] is bounded by e ε for all neighboring t, t and s, it is plausible that the worst case behavior (i.e., outputting s such that Pr[M (t) = s]/ Pr[M (t ) = s] = e ε ) occurs with only a tiny probability. This suggests that while v i · ε may not be a good measure for information utility, it can serve as a good upper bound for this utility. Examining the measure in [Xiao 2011] and trying to avoid the problem demonstrated in Example 3.1 above, we note that by Observation 1 I(t i ; M (t)) ≥ I(t i ; M (t −i , σ(t i ))) for all σ, hence, we get that v i ·I(t i ; M (t)) is another plausible upper bound for information utility. Finally, taking into account Observation 2 we get that I(t i ; M (t)) ≤ ε log e and hence we choose to use v i · ε as it is the weaker of these bounds. NOTE 1. We emphasize that although our usage of the term v i · ε is syntactically similar to that of [Ghosh and Roth 2011] , our usage of this quantity is conceptually very different. In particular, while loss of privacy cannot be used in our constructions for deterring non-truthful agents, the constructions (and proofs) in [Ghosh and Roth 2011] use the fact that the information utility is (at least) v i · ε for arguing truthfulness. NOTE 2. Lemma 2.2 supports using v i ·ε as an upperbound for information utility in the follwing sense. An individual's concern about her privacy corresponds to a potential decrease in future utility due to information learned about her. An upper bound on information utility hence should correspond to this (potential) loss in future utility. By Lemma 2.2, the information contributed by individual i affects the expectation of every non-negative (similarly, non-positive) function g by at most a factor of e ε . Let G i : S → R describe how the future utility of individual i depends on the outcome of M . By Lemma 2.2, the information utility of that individual is bounded by
where the approximation holds for small ε. See also a related discussion in [Ghosh and Roth 2011] .
Privacy of v i . The mechanisms presented in [Ghosh and Roth 2011] for selling private information do not protect the privacy of v i nor they account for the information (dis)utility generated by the leakage of v i . It is further shown that with unbounded v i s it is impossible to construct mechanisms that compensate agents for their loss in privacy and achieve reasonable accuracy (in the sense that enough agents sell their information).
Our mechanisms provide an intermediate solution. First, we provide ε-differential privacy to all agents, where the guarantee is with respect to their combined type, i.e., (t i , v i ), and where ε decreases with the number of agents n. This means that privacy improves as n grows.
Furthermore our constructions guarantee that truthfulness is dominant -taking information utility about the combined type (t i , v i ) into account -for all agents for which v i ≤ v max , where under a very mild assumption on the distribution of v i the bound v max grows with n and the fraction of agents for which v i > v max decreases with n.
THE MODEL
The Mechanism. Let S be a finite set of alternatives (a.k.a. social alternatives), let T be a finite type set and consider a set of n agents. We consider direct revelation mechanisms that given the declaration of agents about their types selects a social alternative s ∈ S and makes s public. To isolate loss of privacy due to publication of s from other potential sources of leakage, we will assume that every other information (including, e.g., the agents' declared types and individual monetary transfers) is completely hidden using cryptographic or other techniques.
The Objective Function. The goal of the designer is defined via a real, non-negative objective function over the true types of the agents, f (t, s) that needs to be optimized (by choosing s).
Following [Dwork et al. 2006; McSherry and Talwar 2007] we define the sensitivity of f to be
where the maximum is taken over all neighboringt,t ∈ T n and s ∈ S. We assume that for all s the minimum value of f (t, s) is 0 and then, given that sensitivity is ∆f we get that for all t ∈ T n , s ∈ S,
Privacy-Aware Agents. We extend the traditional setting of selfish agents to include agents who care not only about their utility u out i from the outcome s of the mechanism, but also about the (negative) information utility u inf i incurred from the leakage of information about their private type through the public output s.
For simplicity, we consider a setting where the overall utility of an agent is the sum of the two: 2
where T is the "traditional" game type and v i is the privacy valuation of agent i. We emphasize that agents care about the privacy of the whole pair and the information utility corresponds to the loss in privacy of both t i and v i (hence, one cannot simply publish v i ). The vectors t = (t 1 , . . . , t n ) and v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) denote the types of all agents. Trying to maximize her utility, agent i may hence act strategically and declare
The "traditional" game utility of agent i is defined as u out i : T ×S → [−1, 1]. Following our discussion above, we define u inf i : R ≥0 → R ≥0 , and the only assumption we make is that
ε being the parameter of the differentially private mechanism executed (i.e., e ε = max (M (t)(S)/M (t )(S)) where the maximum is taken over all neighboring t, t ∈ T n and S ⊆ S). Note that unlike u out i that only depends on the outcome of the mechanism, u inf i depends on the mechanism itself. In our analysis we identify a subset of agents that we call participating for whom truthtelling is strictly dominant. A mechanism approximately implements f if assuming that participating agents act truthfully (and other agents act arbitrarily) it outputs s that approximately optimizes f .
Warmup: A Privacy-Aware Poll
The following simple electronic poll will serve to illustrate some of our ideas:
Example 4.1 (An Electronic Poll). An electronic publisher wishes to determine which of its m ≥ 2 electronic magazines is more popular. Every agent is asked to specify her favorite magazine, i.e., t i ∈ [m], and will receive in exchange an electronic copy of it. For simplicity, we assume that agents' utility depends only on the magazine she receives and not on the poll outcome.
Following our convention, we assume ideal cryptography here, that is, no information beyond the outcome of the poll is leaked. In particular, every agent receives the electronic magazine without anybody (including the publisher) knowing which magazine has been transferred. Agents, however, are privacy-aware, and hence take into account that the outcome of the poll itself reveals information about their preferences.
Denote by t the vector of agents' declarations. For s ∈ [m] let f (s, t ) = |{i : t i = s}| and note that ∆f = 1. Consider the exponential mechanism M = M ε 2 f as in Definition 2.3. I.e., Pr[M (t ) = j] = e εn j /2 m =1 e εn /2 , where n j = f (j, t ) is the number of agents who declared they rank magazine j first. By Theorem 2.4, M preserves ε-differential privacy.
Note that if n j ≥ n + k then Pr[M (t ) = ] ≤ e εn /2 e εn j /2 ≤ e εn /2 e ε(n +k)/2 = e −εk/2 . Hence,
is the utility that the agent gains from receiving the magazine she specified she prefers. Note that this utility depends only on the declared type and it is maximized for t i , the true type of the agent; we assume that u out
is the privacy loss from the mechanism.
Note that ε < g/v i suffices for making agent i truthful: acting untruthfully agent i will lose at least g in u out i and gain no more than εv i in u inf i . Denote by n j the number of agents who rank magazine j first (note the difference from n j that correspond to declared types). To demonstrate that the mechanism is efficient, we need to make some (hopefully reasonable) assumptions on the distribution of v i . We explore three possibilities:
Bounded v i . We begin with a simplified setting where we assume that there exists v max = O(1) such that ∀i : v i ≤ v max . In this case it is enough to set ε < g/v max = O(1) to make truthfulness dominant for all agents. Hence, assuming all agents are truthful, we get n j = n j for all j ∈ [m] and hence the probability that M (t ) = M (t) outputs such that n < max j n j − k is bounded by (m − 1)e −εk/2 .
Note that in this case the computation output leaks no information about the privacy valuations v.
Bounded v i , Except for a Small Number of Agents. A more realistic setting allows for a small number of agents with v i > v max . We change the mechanism M to also consider the reported v i so that inputs from agents with v i ≥ v max are ignored. Regardless of what agents with v i > v max report, we call them non-participating.
As before, by setting ε < g/v max we make truthfulness dominant for all agents with v i ≤ v max . We can hence guarantee a non-trivial accuracy. Let n np be the number of non-participating agents. In the worst case, non-participating agents deflate the count of a popular magazine and inflate the count of an unpopular magazine, making it look more popular than it really is. Taking this into account, we get that
Note that we lose truthfulness for non-participating agents. We do, however, guarantee ε-differential privacy for these agents.
Large Populations. Assume we do not care if the mechanism does not output the most popular choice if it does not have significant advantage over the other, e.g., when k + n np = O(n α ) for some 0 < α < 1. This allows us to set ε(n) = n −α and hence truthfulness is dominant for agents with v i ≤ g/ε = v max (n) ∈ O(n α ). Note that v max grows with n, hence we expect the fraction of non-participants n np /n to diminish with n. If n is large enough so that the fraction of agents for which v i > v max (n) is at most 1/n 1−α then we get the desired accuracy.
As before, we lose truthfulness for non-participating agents, and only guarantee ε(n)-differential privacy for the non-participating agents. Note, however, that the fraction of non-participating agents diminishes with n, and, furthermore, their privacy guarantee improves with n (i.e., ε(n) decreases).
Admissible Privacy Valuations
In the rest of the paper we only focus on large populations. We will design our mechanisms for "nicely-behaving" populations:
To partly justify our focus on admissible valuations, consider the case where v i are chosen, i.i.d., from some underlying distribution D over R ≥0 .
Note that if D has finite expectation, then (using Markov's inequality)
, and hence D is (α, β)-admissible for all β ≤ 2α. More generally, consider the following simple generalization of Chebyshev's inequality to even pth moment:
Using this inequality in the argument above we get that if D has finite even pth moment then D is (α, β)-admissible for all β ≤ pα. We conclude that if D has finite pth moment then D is (α, 1 − α)-admissible for α ≥ 1/(p + 1). In particular, if D has finite moments of all orders then D is (α, 1 − α)-admissible for all α ∈ (0, 1). These simple observations suggest that (α, 1 − α)-admissibility is a relatively mild assumption that would typically hold in large populations even for small values of α.
NOTE 3. It is reasonable to consider even a stronger notion of admissibility: A valuation distribution D is called α-strongly admissible if
where n −ω(1) denotes a function that is negligible in n. For example, the Normal distribution is strongly admissible. In our analysis, however, we only use the more conservative notion of admissibility as in definitions 4.2 and 4.3.
The Privacy-Aware Poll with Admissible Valuations
Returning to our example, let α be the smallest positive value such that the agent population can be assumed to be (α, 1 − α)-admissible. By setting v max = n α and ε = g/v max = gn −α we get that n np ≤ n·n −(1−α) = n α . Finally, setting k = n α (log n) 2 log m/g we get the following: CLAIM 1. The probability that M (t ) outputs such that n < max j n j − 2k is negligible in n.
A GENERIC CONSTRUCTION OF PRIVACY-AWARE MECHANISMS
We now present a generic feasibility result for privacy-aware mechanisms. Our construction is based on the construction of [Nissim et al. 2012] , where differential privacy is used as a tool for mechanism design. The hope is that the existence of this generic construction, a relatively simple modification of [Nissim et al. 2012] , is a signal that our model of privacy-aware mechanisms allows constructing mechanisms for many other tasks.
Reactions. We first change our model to incorporate the notion of reactions introduced in [Nissim et al. 2012] . 3 Traditionally, an agent's utility is a function of her private type and the social alternative, and the issue of how agents exploit the social choice is not treated explicitly. In [Nissim et al. 2012] this choice was made explicit such that after a social choice is made agents need to take an action (denoted reaction) to exploit the social alternative and determine their utility. In [Nissim et al. 2012] (and likewise in this work) allowing the mechanism to sometimes restrict the reactions of agents serves as a deterrent against non-truthful agents.
Let R be a finite set of reactions. We modify the definition of the utility from the outcome of the mechanism to u out
to be the optimal reaction for agent i on outcome s.
To illustrate the concept of reactions, consider a mechanism for setting a price for an unlimited supply good (such as in Example 5.2 appearing below). Once the mechanism chooses a price s the possible reactions are buy (i.e., pay s and get the good) and not buy (i.e., do not pay s and do not get the good), and reactions are kept hidden by assuming payment and reception of the digital good using perfect cryptography. In this example agents reactions may be restricted to buy whenever they bid at least the selected price s, and not buy otherwise.
Utility Gap. We assume the existence of a positive gap g such that for all t i = t i there exist s for which the optimal reactions are distinct, and, furthermore, u out i (t i , s, r i (t i , s)) ≥ u out i (t i , s, r i (t i , s)) + g. In many settings, a gap g can be created by considering a discrete set of social choices. As in our polling example, an alternative interpretation of the gap g may be that the mechanism designer does not care if agent i reports t i if u out i (t i , s, r i (t i , s)) < u out i (t i , s, r i (t i , s)) + g.
The Construction
Given a finite type set T , a finite set S of alternatives and an objective function f : T n × S → R with sensitivity ∆f , we construct a mechanism for approximately implementing f .
Let n be the number of agents, and let α be the smallest positive value such that the agent population can be assumed to be (α, 1 − α)-admissible. Let v max = n α . The participating agents will be those with privacy valuations lower than v max . Choose t ⊥ ∈ T to be an arbitrary element of T . Non-participating agents will be asked to declare t ⊥ .
Let opt(t) = max s∈S f (t, s) be the optimal value for f . We next show that our mechanism approximately recovers opt(t).
PROOF. Define opt = max s f (t , s). Denote byt k the vector constructed from the k first entries of t and the n − k last entries of t . For all s we have that
Note that by Claim 2 t i = t i for at most n α entries, and hence f (t k , s) − f (t k+1 , s) = 0 for at most n α values of k, in which case it is upper bounded by ∆f . We get hence that opt ≥ opt(t) − n α ∆f .
We get that M 1 (t ) outputs s such that f (t , s ) < opt − 2∆f ln(n|S|)/ε with probability
Using the union bound (over elements of S), and the fact that opt ≤ n∆f , we get a lower bound on the expected revenue of M 1 as follows: Setting ε = n −(1+α)/2 g ln(n|S|)/|S| and δ = 2n (α−1)/2 |S| ln(n|S|)/g we get THEOREM 5.1. Let n be the number of agents, T be a finite type set and S a finite set of alternatives. Let f : T n × S → R be an objective function with sensitivity ∆f and M be the mechanism described in Algorithm 1.
If α is such that the agent population can be assumed to be (α, 1 − α)-admissible, then M recovers opt(t) to within additive difference of O ∆f n (1+α)/2 |S| ln(n|S|)/g .
As discussed above, natural distributions of the privacy valuations will be (α, 1 − α)admissible even for very small values of α, and therefore the dominating term in the expression in Theorem 5.1 can be made arbitrarily close toÕ( √ n).
NOTE 4. The proof of Theorem 5.1 only considers pure (i.e., deterministic) strategies. Extending the theorem to mixed strategies requires a proper relaxation of the solution concept, namely, to implementation in undominated strategies.
Example: Privacy-Aware Selling of Digital Goods
We describe now an example of a natural privacy-aware mechanism that naturally falls within our framework.
Example 5.2 (Pricing a Digital Good). An auctioneer selling a digital good wishes to design a single price mechanism that would (approximately) optimize her revenue. Every party has a valuation t i ∈ Q = {0, 1 q , 2 q , . . . , 1} for the good (for some constant q), and a privacy preference v i . Agents are asked to declare t i to the mechanism, which chooses a price p for the good. Denote by t i the actual declaration of agent i. If t i ≥ p then agent i receives the good and pays p, otherwise, agent i learns p but does not pay nor receive the good. Agents prefer receiving the good to not receiving it.
-The utility u out is the 'traditional' utility, i.e., zero if agent i does not receive the good, and t i − p + 1 2q otherwise, where the additive 1 2q is used for modeling preference to receive the good.
-For u inf , we assume that whether agent i received the good and paid for it can be kept completely hidden from all other parties (this can be implemented using cryptographic techniques). Hence, only leakage due to making p public affects u inf .
Consider now the auctioneer from Example 5.2, and assume that the valuations t i are taken from T = {0, 1 q , 2 q , . . . , 1} and similarly, the price p ∈ S = { 1 q , 2 q , . . . , 1} for some integer constant q > 1. Let α be the smallest value such that the agent population can be assumed to be (α, 1 − α)-admissible.
Defining the reactions to be {buy, not buy} and optimal reactions r i (t, p) = buy if t ≥ p and not buy otherwise we get that the gap g is 1/2q.
Suppose the designer goal is to recover the optimal revenue, i.e., max p∈S f (t, p) where f (t, p) = p · |{i : t i ≥ p}| and note that ∆f = 1.
Using Theorem 5.1 we get a privacy-aware mechanism that recovers the optimal revenue to within additive difference of O ∆f n (1+α)/2 |S| ln(n|S|)/g = O n (1+α)/2 q ln(nq) . Note that the accuracy of this privacy aware mechanism is only (essentially) a fac-torÕ(n α 2 ) away from the similar (non-privacy aware) mechanism from [Nissim et al. 2012] .
